P olicy studies often evaluate health for an individual or for a population by using measurement scales that are ordinal scales or expected-utility scales. This paper develops scales of a different type, commonly called cardinal scales, that measure changes in health. Also, we argue that cardinal scales provide a meaningful and useful means of evaluating health policies. Thus, we develop a means of using the perspective of early neoclassical welfare economics as an alternative to ordinalist and expected-utility perspectives.
Introduction
A policy analyst who wishes to evaluate the effects of a social policy on the health of an individual or within a population has a variety of measurement scales and supporting procedures to choose from. Typically, the scale is an ordinal-utility scale or an expected-utility scale.
Both types of scales represent binary relations that compare health alternatives; an ordinal-utility scale represents a relation on health outcomes such that greater scale amounts correspond to better outcomes, and an expected-utility scale represents a relation on probability distributions of health such that greater expected values of scale amounts correspond to better distributions.
This paper develops models and procedures for a different type of binary relation and scale; here, better changes in health correspond to greater differences in scale amounts. A relation that compares changes in outcomes is commonly called a cardinal relation, and a scale that represents a cardinal relation in this manner is commonly called a cardinal scale.
But other terminology is used with these meanings, and this terminology is used with other meanings. For example, a cardinal relation (as defined here) is also called a difference relation, an intensity relation, or a strength-of-preference relation, and a cardinal scale is also defined as any scale that is unique up to a positive linear transformation, e.g., an expected-utility function. Thus, it is not possible to adopt definitions that agree with all those in the literature.
Each of the three types of binary relations may or may not satisfy conditions that imply the existence of a scale that represents the relation. For example, a so-called lexicographic ordinal relation has no ordinal scale. A disadvantage of the terms cardinal relation and cardinal scale is that they do not indicate this important distinction.
This paper presents models that contain cardinal scales for the health of an individual and for the health of members of a population. In the first part, we argue that changes in individual health and in population health can be meaningfully compared in a policy study of population health, and thus cardinal relations have an operational meaning in such a context. And as a stronger point, we argue that changes in population health are often the relevant objects to compare in such a study as a means to compare the effectiveness of policy options.
In the second part of this paper, we develop cardinal scales for the health of an individual. Here we consider health outcomes of two types: health states and health-duration pairs. By a health state, we mean the health of a person, measured by one or more variables. And by a health-duration pair, we mean a health state and, as additional information, the duration of the health state. We do not consider health outcomes that are sequences of health states or that are streams of health states over an interval of time.
We present models in which a cardinal relation on a person's health outcomes satisfies certain conditions if and only if it is represented by a cardinal scale that has a certain form. For example, we show that a cardinal relation on health-duration pairs satisfies certain conditions if and only if it has a cardinal scale that is a product of a cumulative discounting function and a scale defined on health states. An open question is whether parallel results can be obtained for health outcomes that are sequences of health states or streams of health states over a bounded or unbounded interval of time.
The third part of this paper discusses the aggregation of cardinal scales for the members of a population into a cardinal scale for the population as a whole. We adapt to the context of health a model of Harvey (1999) in which a cardinal relation for population welfare is represented by a cardinal scale that is a weighted sum of cardinal scales for the population members. This model is parallel to the well-known model of Harsanyi (1955) that aggregates expectedutility functions for the members of a population into an expected-utility function for the population.
The third part of this paper also discusses conditions on social values that imply simplifications in a cardinal health model, e.g., equal weights, and it discusses assessment procedures by which a policy analyst can construct cardinal scales for individual and population health in such a model.
The fourth part of this paper discusses procedures by which a model that has been constructed can be used to evaluate a change in population health, for example, a change that is predicted to result from a policy option. In brief, a policy analyst can calculate a change in population health that is indifferent to the given change and that is much simpler to report. Also, he can compare the effectiveness of policy options by comparing these simple equivalent changes. A utility scale that is not a cardinal scale cannot provide such an evaluation or comparison of policy options.
This paper concludes with a hypothetical application that evaluates a proposed therapy for the reduction of hypertension, commonly known as high blood pressure.
The interest throughout this paper is prescriptive. The models and procedures are intended for studies of population health that are concerned with valuing as well as predicting the effects of alternative policies. As in the case of expected-utility, there surely are many types of violations of the conditions on values that are presented here. That important subject we do not address.
Most of the analytic results in this paper, as well as in Harvey (1999) , are based on work by the Danish mathematician J. L. W. V. Jensen (1905 Jensen ( , 1906 . Proofs of results are in the appendix.
Meaningful Interpretations of a Cardinal Relation
This section and the next discuss cardinal relations and cardinal scales, respectively. These discussions are intended as a background, although a very incomplete one, for the models and procedures presented in later sections. Pareto (1896) and Fisher (1918) pointed out long ago that the term "utility" had two different meanings: (i) an older, hedonic meaning in utilitarianism and classical welfare theory as the degree of pleasure and pain (or welfare, well-being, etc.) that a person experiences as part of a specified consequence, and (ii) a newer, choice-oriented meaning in consumer theory as the degree to which a consequence satisfies a person's preferences. Pareto gave an illustration in which the two meanings differ: a child may experience better health by taking medicine even though the child much prefers not to take the medicine.
This distinction in the meaning of utility is logically independent of that between a cardinal relation and an ordinal relation. Historically, however, the two distinctions have sometimes been confused. An insufficient recognition of the distinction in the meaning of utility made by Pareto (1896) and Fisher (1918) (and a disagreement as to whether cardinal comparisons were needed in economics) led to a schism between early INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
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neoclassical welfare economists, who used hedonic utility and cardinal relations, and so-called new welfare economists, who used choice-oriented utility and ordinal relations. Cooter and Rappoport (1984, p. 507) note that " [t] he term 'ordinalist revolution' refers to the rejection of cardinal notions of utility and to the general acceptance of the position that utility was not comparable across individuals." In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in the hedonic meaning of utility; see, e.g., Broome (1991a, b; 2004) , Kahneman et al. (1997) , Kahneman (2000) , Loewenstein and Ubel (2008) , and Dolan and Kahneman (2008) . In this paper, cardinal relations can have either a hedonic or a choice-oriented interpretation. Below, we argue that either interpretation is meaningful in a study of population health-and thus one should be able to use cardinal relations with either interpretation as a part of the study.
Explicitly or implicitly, a study of population health assumes value judgments concerning health, often called social values. Judgments that compare changes in a person's health can be made by the person himself or they can be made by someone else (an expert, an agency, or an idealized person). Such an entity often is called a social planner. Usually but not always, the social planner will follow the hedonic evaluations or the preferences of the affected individuals.
If a cardinal relation on changes in a person's health is regarded as comparing changes in what the person experiences, then the comparisons are possible in principle, no matter how difficult they may be in practice. And if a cardinal relation on changes in health for a population has a similar hedonic meaning, then the comparisons of changes are possible in a similar fashion.
But if a cardinal relation on changes in health is regarded as the preferences of a person or a group, then an important question is whether or not the comparisons are meaningful. Here, we argue that a cardinal relation regarded as preferences can have meaning. Other arguments for meaningfulness are presented in von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986, pp. 208-211) .
The argument that cardinal relations as preferences are not meaningful has two parts. The first part is to observe that an individual facing a decision is at a single initial position. Changes from that position can be identified with their final outcomes, and comparisons of changes are not needed. It suffices to observe the behavior of the individual in choosing outcomes.
The second part of the argument is as follows. A classic technique of economic analysis is to specify a set of alternatives to be compared so that it contains alternatives that are not possible but are similar in structure to the possible alternatives. Then, a binary relation can be extended, at least in principle, from the set of possible alternatives to the larger set of alternatives. But outcomes and changes in outcomes do not have a similar structure; thus, it is not meaningful to extend a relation from a set of outcomes to a set of both outcomes and changes.
We think that this argument is valid but that for prescriptive studies of population health it does not preclude the meaningfulness of cardinal relations. To explain, we must first describe what we mean by such a study. We mean a study whose purpose is to examine policy options. Part of the study is empirical, describing and predicting the consequences of the options. And part is normative, assigning values to the consequences. The values may be hedonic, e.g., percents of infections prevented, or they may be choice oriented, e.g., preferences in the form of trade-offs between categories of injury. In either case, the values are prescriptive: when hedonic, they reflect choices by the policy analyst as to which harms and benefits to include, and when choice oriented, they are preferences that the analyst has assigned by a process of assumption and assessment (which the analyst should make explicit) rather than by a direct reporting of choice behavior.
The actions of the policy options may be interventions in a single population (including the option of nonintervention), they may be a single intervention in many populations (including the case of a population at different times), or they may involve multiple populations and multiple types of intervention. The consequences of the interventions are the changes in health that they are estimated to have effected or are predicted to effect. Often the initial distribution of health in a population will not be uniform, i.e., not everyone has the same initial health. And often when more than one population is involved (as in the hypothetical application in §10), the populations will not have the same initial distribution of health. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
Consider the second part of the argument that cardinal relations as preferences lack meaning, namely, the argument that a relation cannot be extended from outcomes to changes in outcomes. For studies of population health, the argument is valid but not relevant; the consequences to be compared are changes. There is no question of extending a relation that compares outcomes to one that compares changes, that is, of extending an ordinal relation to a cardinal relation.
The first part of the argument, like the second, is valid but not relevant. Even when there is a single population, most likely the individuals are not at the same initial position; their changes in health will entail different initial positions as well as different final positions. And when there is more than one population, then most likely the initial distributions of health in the populations are different; changes in distributions of health will entail different initial distributions of health as well as different final distributions of health.
The preferences in a prescriptive study of population health are not descriptive; they are introduced according to a process other than direct observation of choice behavior. The process constitutes their meaning, and the above arguments fail to deny that meaning.
Actually, we take a stronger position than that argued for above. We believe that cardinal relations as preferences are meaningful even when there is only one population and one initial distribution of health. We will argue for this position indirectly by making an analogy with preferences between uncertain outcomes. Suppose that a decision analyst wishes to construct a prescriptive model of preferences for a situation in which the consequences are prospects having two outcomes, the first being a specified status quo position and the second being an outcome in a specified set. To make the situation less realistic but a better analogy, assume that the two outcomes are equally likely. Here, the prospects can be identified with their second outcomes, and comparisons of prospects are not needed. Perhaps the decision analyst will judge that an ordinal-utility model that compares the second outcomes is appropriate, or perhaps he or she will judge that an expected-utility model that compares probability distributions is appropriate.
But we doubt that the analyst would like to be told that an expected-utility model is meaningless.
The motivating question for this paper is not whether cardinal relations as preferences are meaningful; rather, it is whether they are useful in prescriptive models on population health. We believe that the answer will depend on the situation that a policy analyst faces and that it also will and should depend on the proclivities of the analyst. The goal of this paper, and the focus of the following sections, is to provide a few tools for an analyst who chooses to use cardinal relations.
Cardinal Scales
Suppose that h denotes a health outcome of any type for an individual or for a population, and that H denotes a set of health outcomes h. Suppose also that a change from a health outcome h to a health outcome h is denoted by h → h . We will refer to comparisons of these changes as preferences even though they may also have a hedonic interpretation. A statement that a change h → h is at least as preferred as a change k → k will be denoted by h → h k → k .
Cardinal relations and cardinal scales will be defined as follows. A set of statements, h → h k → k , where the health outcomes are in a set H , will be called a cardinal relation and will be denoted by . We will say that is defined on the set H . Other types of comparisons, e.g., "is preferred to" and "is indifferent to," will be defined in terms of . And a function w h defined on H will be called a cardinal scale for provided that h → h k → k if and only if w h − w h ≥ w k − w k for any health outcomes in H .
A cardinal relation induces a relation, called an ordinal relation, that compares outcomes themselves. Such a relation ord can be defined by h ord h if and only if h → h h → h. A cardinal scale w h for is an ordinal scale for ord (because h ord h if and only if w h − w h ≥ w h − w h if and only if w h ≥ w h ), but not every ordinal scale for ord is a cardinal scale for . An ordinal scale is ordinally unique; that is, if w h is an ordinal scale, then a function w * (h is also if and only if there exists a strictly increasing function f w such that w * (h = f w h for h in H . As in the case of expected utility, a cardinal relation must satisfy certain conditions in order to have a INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
cardinal scale. The condition that corresponds to the independence principle is often called dynamic consistency. It states that h → h k → k and h → h k → k imply h → h k → k for any health outcomes in the set H. Various models for the existence of a cardinal scale have been constructed; see, e.g., Alt (1936) , Debreu (1960) , Scott (1964) , Pfanzagl (1968) , and Krantz et al. (1971) . Except for the model of Scott (1964) , the conditions also imply that the cardinal scale is cardinally unique; that is if w h is a cardinal scale, then a function w * h is also if and only if there exist constants a > 0 and b such that w
The models of Alt (1936) , Debreu (1960) , and Pfanzagl (1968) assume that the set H is topologically connected in a given topology, and they establish that a cardinal relation satisfies the conditions if and only if it has a continuous cardinal scale, that is, a continuous function w h . Because H is connected, the range of such a function is an interval.
It will simplify our models to assume that there exist health outcomes that are not indifferent. This will be the case if and only if any cardinal scale has a nonpoint range.
In a policy study, the analyst should determine the appropriateness of conditions that imply the existence of a cardinal scale having the properties described above. However, for the purpose of developing the models in this paper, we will directly assume these implications.
Definition 1. A cardinal or ordinal relation will be called proper provided that it has a topologically continuous scale whose range is a nonpoint interval. Any such scale will be called proper. If the health outcomes in a set H are described by one or more variables whose domains are intervals, then the set H is (topologically) connected. And if H is connected and satisfies conditions that imply the existence of a continuous, nonpoint cardinal scale, then is proper. Here, the assumption that the set H is connected can be weakened. If the outcomes in H are described by one or more variables whose domains are intervals and (possibly) also by one or more variables whose domains are finite and have sufficiently fine gradations, then H has a more general property, called "preferential connectedness." Harvey (2008) shows that the assumption of connectedness can be weakened to that of preferential connectedness.
Health States
This section and the next present models of cardinal scales that evaluate changes in health for an individual. In this section, a health outcome is a state of a person's health. For example, the health outcome may be a morbidity or an injury, or it may be the condition of the person's health in general. A health outcome defined in this manner will be called a health state.
In a policy study, the health states are described by one or more health variables (often called ratings, dimensions, health scales, etc.). A health variable may have either an interval domain or a finite domain. Typically, the set of health states to be compared is defined as the product set of the domains of the variables. However, we will not require this condition here.
In the discussion below, the term "ordinal scale" will mean any scale (including an expected-utility scale) that compares health states and has not been verified to be a cardinal scale. Suppose that a policy analyst wishes to construct a cardinal scale for a set of health states. The method that we develop is for the analyst first to obtain an ordinal scale and then to either verify that the ordinal scale is cardinal or to construct a cardinal scale that is based on the ordinal scale.
An advantage of this approach is that it enables the analyst to separate two different issues of preferences. The ordinal scale represents the issue of trade-offs between the health variables, e.g., for a given decrease in one variable, how much increase in another variable is needed to produce an indifferent health state. The cardinal scale can then be defined on the single ordinal scale, rather than on the health variables. It represents the issue of preference intensity between the values of the ordinal scale, e.g., for a given increase and a given third value, how much does the third value need to increase to produce a change that is indifferent to the given increase. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
A second advantage of the approach is that a wide variety of ordinal scales are available for the analyst to use. Often, such a scale is called "health-related quality of life" or "quality of life" (see, e.g., Gold et al. 1996 , Dolan et al. 1996 , Dolan 2000 . For brevity, we will use the term quality scale to refer to any ordinal scale when the health outcomes are health states.
Quality scales have been developed both for morbidity and trauma. Examples of this type of scale are the Functional Capacity Index, the Quality of Wellbeing Scale (Kaplan and Anderson 1996) , the Health Utilities Indices (Torrance et al. 1982 (Torrance et al. , 1995 Feeny et al. 1996; Furlong et al. 1998) , the Health and Activities Limitation Index, the SF-36 metric for health status measurement, and the EuroQoL quality of life scales (Kind 1996 , Dolan 1997 , Richardson et al. 2001 .
Procedures to assess a quality scale have been developed, either as part of a health study or as a separate undertaking. Examples of these assessment procedures (commonly called scales) include time trade-off scales, standard gamble scales, person trade-off scales, and rating scales; see, e.g., Torrance (1976 Torrance ( , 1986 and Dolan et al. (1996) .
Below we develop models of cardinal scales that depend on a predetermined quality scale. The quality scale can be an established scale, a scale that is constructed as part of a study, or a health variable if health states are described by a single variable. A health state will be denoted by s, a set of health states will be denoted by S, and a quality scale will be denoted by q s . The hypothetical application in §10 concerning hypertension illustrates the use of cardinal constancy. To oversimplify somewhat, here the quality scale is blood pressure and the cardinal scale is the risk of heart disease.
The proof of part (i) is based on Jensen's (1905 Jensen's ( , 1906 ) functional equation, which in the present notation is f f q . The proof of part (ii) is based on a similar functional relationship introduced in Harvey (1990) for models of risk attitudes.
Health-Duration Pairs
In this section, a health outcome consists of a single health state and its duration. A health outcome INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
defined in this manner will be called a health-duration pair. The duration of a health state can be defined as the time from a specified event, e.g., an accident or the onset of a disease, in which case different individuals in a population will have different initial times, or it can be defined as the time from a common initial time, e.g., a specified present time.
A health state will again be denoted by s, and its duration in years will be denoted by t. Thus, a healthduration pair will be denoted by (s t). A quality scale will again be denoted by q s .
Most models of health-duration pairs are expectedutility models; see, e.g., Bleichrodt et al. (1997) for a discussion of the advantages of such models. The simplest utility functions are of the form u s t = tq s , where the linear factor t represents risk neutrality toward duration. In these models, the utility u s t of a health-duration pair (or the expected utility of a probability distribution) is an amount that represents an equivalent duration in a state of optimal health; this amount is called "quality-adjusted life years" (QALYs) or "healthy-years equivalents" (HYEs).
We regard the various QALY models due to Pliskin et al. (1980) as the basic expected-utility models for health-duration pairs. Alternative conditions on preferences are presented in Bleichrodt et al. (1997) , Miyamoto et al. (1998), and Hazen (2004) for expected-utility models, and in Doctor and Miyamoto (2003) and Østerdal (2005) for deterministic models. QALY models for health-duration pairs are also discussed in Loomes and McKenzie (1989) , Broome (1993) , Johannesson et al. (1994) , Gold et al. (1996) , and Dolan (2000) .
Using an ordinal-utility approach, Mehrez and Gafni (1989) developed QALY/HYE models. They proposed a procedure in which a health-duration pair is measured by assessing an indifferent healthduration pair in which HYE years (i.e., the healthyyears equivalent) of optimal health are followed by death. See also, e.g., Gafni et al. (1993) , Loomes (1995) , and Johannesson (1995) .
Describing health outcomes as health states or as health-duration pairs is a simplification. It may be appropriate because of data limitations, but it entails assumptions (whether stated or not) regarding what occurs after the health state. In this section, we assume that a common health state occurs afterward. An alternative assumption would be to assume that what occurs afterward is stochastically independent of the health state; in §9, we examine a related assumption of stochastic independence for a population of individuals.
This section develops cardinal scales for a cardinal relation concerning health-duration pairs. We introduce various conditions on and its associated ordinal relation, and show that they imply (and are implied by) the existence of cardinal scales for that have various properties or special forms. Throughout, we assume that is a proper cardinal relation defined on a product set S × T , where S is a set of health states as in the previous section and T is a set of durations.
Suppose that s 0 denotes the health state that occurs after the health state in a health-duration pair. The state s 0 will be called the standard state. It may be specified as, e.g., death, optimal health, or a return to previous health. We assume that s 0 is in the set S of health states, and we make no assumption as to whether S contains health states that are better than or worse than s 0 . In particular, when s 0 is a state of death, the set S can contain health states that are worse than death. For expected-utility models having states worse than death, see Miyamoto et al. (1998) .
Ethical arguments have been made for an "equal value of life" principle that society should not compare fatalities with nondeath health states; see, e.g., Harris (1987) and Nord (2001) . In the case that s 0 is a state of death, this principle is not consistent with the models presented here. For reasons why social preferences among health outcomes should depend on degrees of health and duration; see, e.g., Singer et al. (1995) , Williams (1997) , and Hasman and Østerdal (2004) .
Health-duration pairs of the form (s 0 t describe the same health outcome because the state s 0 occurs after the time t. Thus, pairs of the form (s 0 t should be modeled as indifferent.
Moreover, for a fixed duration t, the cardinal relation defines a cardinal relation S t for health states by s 1 → s 2 S t s 3 → s 4 provided that (s 1 t → s 2 t s 3 t → s 4 t). When the relations S t are the same for any duration t, they can be regarded as a single cardinal relation. We will denote such a cardinal relation by S and say that induces the relation S . INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
These two comments can be formalized as the following conditions on a cardinal relation :
(A) Any two health-duration pairs with the standard state s 0 are (ordinally) indifferent.
(B) The relation restricted to health-duration pairs with a fixed duration t is independent of t, and the relation S induced by is a proper cardinal relation.
Condition (B) is not appropriate when the set T contains the duration t = 0. For it seems natural to assume that any pairs (s 0) are indifferent. For positive durations, however, (B) seems appropriate, at least for prescriptive uses in population health studies. In medical decision making, (B) can be violated by the stated preferences of a patient; see, e.g., Miyamoto et al. (1998) .
Lemma 2. Suppose that is a proper cardinal relation for a set S × T of health-duration pairs. Then, satisfies conditions (A) and (B) if and only if there exists a cardinal scale for of the form
where a t is a positive, continuous function on the set T of durations, and g s is a continuous function on the set S of health states such that g s has an interval range and g s 0 = 0.
Next, we introduce three additional conditions on a cardinal relation for health-duration pairs. These conditions are concerned with the ordinal relation that is associated with . They imply (and are implied by) further properties of the functions a t and g s in (2).
Assume that T is the semi-infinite interval T = 0 . This choice avoids two issues: that of interpreting health outcomes of zero duration, and that of assigning an upper bound on duration.
As before, imagine that a quality scale q s on the set S of health states has been specified. We will assume that q s is a proper ordinal scale for the cardinal relation S .
If a health state s is preferred to the standard state s 0 , then pairs (s t with greater durations t should be preferred (because the standard state s 0 will occur after the state s . Similarly, if a state s is less preferred than s 0 , then pairs (s t with lesser durations t should be preferred. A pair (s ) with a brief duration should be preferentially close to pairs with the standard state s 0 in the sense defined by condition (E) below. By contrast, Bleichrodt et al. (1997) and Miyamoto et al. (1998) define T = 0 ) and introduce a "zero-condition," which states that any two outcomes (s 1 0) and (s 2 0) are indifferent. This condition and the condition that ordinal preferences are continuous on the set S × 0 ) imply condition (E) on the subset S × 0 ).
These ideas can be stated as conditions on the ordinal relation associated with a relation :
(C) q s is a proper ordinal scale for the cardinal relation S defined by condition (B).
(D) For a health state s and two durations t 1 < t 2 , if s is preferred to s 0 , then (s t 2 is preferred to (s t 1 , and if s is less preferred than s 0 , then (s t 2 is less preferred than (s t 1 ).
(E) For a duration t and two health states s 1 and s 2 , if s 1 and s 2 are preferred to s 0 , then there exists a (small) duration such that (s 2 ) is less preferred than (s 1 t), and if s 0 is preferred to s 1 and s 2 , then there exists a (small) duration such that (s 2 ) is preferred to (s 1 t).
Theorem 3. Suppose that is a proper cardinal relation for a set S × T of health-duration pairs. Suppose also that T = 0 ) and that q s is a function defined on the set S. Then, and q s satisfy conditions (A)-(E) if and only if there exists a proper cardinal scale for of the form
where the following are true: We present part of the proof of (ii) here because it provides a needed explanation. According to a cardinal scale w s t) of the product form (3), if a INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
health state s is preferred to the standard state s 0 (and thus f q s > 0), then greater durations in s are preferred, and if s is less preferred than s 0 (and thus f q s < 0), then lesser durations in s are preferred. Because the scale w s t) is proper and thus has a nonpoint range, at least one of these cases occurs.
With this motivation, we will define a cardinal relation T s for a fixed health state s that is preferred to s 0 by t 1 → t 2 T s t 3 → t 4 , provided that (s t 1 → s t 2 s t 3 → s t 4 ). And for a fixed state s that is less preferred than s 0 , we will define T s by: t 1 → t 2 T s t 3 → t 4 provided that (s t 3 → s t 4 s t 1 → s t 2 ). In each of these cases, the function D t is a cardinal scale for T s . Therefore, the cardinal relations T s , where s is not indifferent to s 0 are the same. We define T as this common cardinal relation.
As shown below, the special conditions defined in §4 for health states can be applied in the context of health-duration pairs as conditions on a relation S , and they imply the same special forms of a conversion function f q . Thus, it suffices in this section to discuss conditions on a cardinal relation that imply special forms of a function D t . Moreover, a restriction for a function, f q or D t , is independent of a restriction on the other function.
Cardinal timing neutrality. For any health state s, durations t 1 < t 2 , and shift t > 0, the changes (s t 1 → s t 2 ) and (s t 1 + t → s t 2 + t) are indifferent. Cardinal timing aversion. For any health state s, durations t 1 < t 2 , and shift t > 0, if s is preferred to s 0 , then (s t 1 → s t 2 ) is preferred to (s t 1 + t → s t 2 + t), and if s is less preferred than s 0 , then (s t 1 → s t 2 ) is less preferred than (s t 1 + t → s t 2 + t).
Cardinal constant timing aversion (I). Preferences are timing averse, and for any s 1 s 2 t 1 < t 2 t > 0, and t > 0, if two changes, (s 1 t 1 → s 1 t 1 + t ) and (s 2 t 2 → s 2 t 2 + t , with the same change t in duration are indifferent, then the changes, (s 1 t 1 + t → s 1 t 1 + t + t) and (s 2 t 2 + t → s 2 t 2 + t + t), are indifferent.
Cardinal constant timing aversion (II). Preferences are timing averse, and for any s t 1 < t 2 t 3 < t 4 , and t > 0, if two changes, (s t 1 → s t 2 ) and (s t 3 → s t 4 ), with the same health state s are indifferent, then the changes, (s t 1 + t → s t 2 + t) and (s t 3 + t → s t 4 + t), are indifferent.
As the terminology indicates, these conditions on cardinal preferences between health-duration pairs are parallel to well-known conditions on ordinal preferences between temporal sequences of events, that is, conditions on discounting. Specifically, the conditions are parallel to conditions often called zero discounting, positive discounting, and constant positive discounting. We will call any continuous, strictly increasing function D t a cumulative discounting function even though not every such function is absolutely continuous. Any linear or strictly concave function D t such as those in Theorem 4 is absolutely continuous. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
In the case of cardinal timing neutrality, the discounting function d t can be chosen as d t = D t = 1; in the case of cardinal constant timing aversion, d t can be chosen as d t = D t = e −rt r > 0; and in the case of cardinal timing aversion, d t can be chosen to be positive and strictly decreasing. In the last case, d t may tend to infinity as t tends to zero, and thus represent extreme discounting of the future compared to the present.
Cardinal Scales for Population Health
Here we come to a division between medical decision making, i.e., the choice of a medical treatment for an identified individual, and health policy analysis, i.e., the evaluation of policy options concerning the health of an identified population. We think that describing health as a health state or as a health-duration pair is often appropriate for health policy analysis, mainly because of the absence of extensive information on each individual in the population, but we think that describing health as a sequence or a stream of health states is appropriate for medical decision making, mainly because of the availability of extensive information on the individual. The objective of this paper is to develop models for health policy analysis. We conjecture, however, that the models in the previous sections could serve as a partial basis for cardinal-utility models for medical decision making. The medical decisionmaking models could be developed by combining these models with discounting models for discreteand continuous-time outcomes in Harvey (1986; 1988; 1998a, b) . The models in Harvey (1988) are expected-utility models, and those in the other papers are ordinal-utility models.
This section is concerned with the aggregation of cardinal scale amounts for the individuals in a population into a cardinal scale amount for the population as a whole. We present a cardinal-utility model that is parallel to the expected-utility model due to Harsanyi (1955) . Except for one generalization (as explained below), the model presented is a specialization for the context of population health of the cardinal-utility social welfare model in Harvey (1999) .
An alternative cardinal-utility welfare model has been developed by Dyer and Sarin (1979) . However, it is an "algebraic" model, and hence does not provide health scales that are continuous functions of the health outcomes. For this reason, we use the "topological" model in Harvey (1999) .
As in §2, the health outcomes can be of any type. Suppose that the individuals in a population are indexed by i = 1 n. A health outcome for an ith individual will be denoted by h i , and the set of such outcomes will be denoted by H i . A distribution of health outcomes over the population will be called a health distribution and will be denoted by h = h 1 h n ). We assume that the set of health distributions is the product set
The social welfare model in Harvey (1999) assumes (as stated in terms of social health) that for each ith individual there is a cardinal relation i that compares changes in (population) health distributions. Because we wish to develop models for the presciptive purpose of examining social health policies, we will assume that i reflects social values regarding health outcomes for the ith individual. Thus, i depends only on the ith components h i in health distributions. Indeed, we define i as a cardinal relation that compares changes h i → h i in health outcomes for the ith individual. We will call i an individual cardinal relation.
This simplification excludes models in which i reflects the personal values of an individual who is altruistic. Such preferences are included in the social welfare model in Harvey (1999) .
The social welfare model also assumes that there is a cardinal relation for changes in health distributions. We will denote such a relation by P and call it a population cardinal relation. A cardinal scale for an individual cardinal relation i will be called an individual scale and will be denoted by w i h i , and a cardinal scale for a population cardinal relation P will be called a population scale and will be denoted by w P (h).
The generalization of the social welfare model in Harvey (1999) is to omit the assumption that each set H i i = 1 n, of health outcomes is topologically connected. Instead, we assume that the individual and population cardinal relations are proper. As discussed in §3, this approach permits some of the variables that describe the health outcomes to have finite domains rather than interval domains provided that each set H i is "preferentially connected." INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
The key assumption, both in Harvey (1999) and here, is the condition below that connects a population cardinal relation to the individual cardinal relations. This condition is analogous to Pareto conditions in additive-utility models and in expected-utility models.
Cardinal Pareto agreement. For any changes h → h and k → k in health distributions, if there is an ith individual such that h j → h j is indifferent to k j → k j for all j = i, then preferences between h → h and k → k according to the population cardinal relation P agree with preferences between h i → h i and k i → k i according to the individual cardinal relation i .
In other words, when society does not need to make trade-offs between changes in the health of different persons, then preferences between changes in public health agree with preferences between changes in health for the one person who matters. In this sense, the Pareto condition is a requirement of individual sovereignty.
Suppose that (h i = h; h k k = i) denotes a health distribution in which the ith individual has the health outcome h and the other individuals have the outcomes indicated. Cardinal Pareto agreement implies that preferences between changes (h i = h; h k k = i → h i = h ; h k k = i) according to the relation P agree with preferences between changes h → h according to the relation i (and thus are independent of the health outcomes h k k = i). 
is a population scale. The weights a i in (5) are unique up to a common positive multiple.
The above model compares changes in population health by a scale that is a linear function of scales that compare changes in health for the members of the population. Hence, it provides a foundation for the utilitarian principle that cardinal utility for a society is the sum (or a weighted sum) of cardinal utilities for the members of the society. The weights a i in the linear function (5) will be called interpersonal weights, and the model will be called a linear health model.
The result that cardinal Pareto agreement implies a linear function (5) may seem surprising. The explanation lies in the difference between ordinal and cardinal uniqueness. Pareto agreement for ordinal preferences implies that a population ordinal scale is a function of individual ordinal scales that is strictly increasing in each scale, but it does not imply any form of the function. As noted above, Pareto agreement for cardinal preferences implies that for fixed outcomes h k k = i, a population scale w P (h) restricted to health distributions of the form (h i = h; h k k = i) is a cardinal scale for the individual cardinal relation i . For an individual scale w i h i , it follows that for these health distributions, w P h = a i w i h i + b i , for some a i > 0 and b i . Theorem 5 can be viewed as an extension of this uniqueness property. Moreover, the social welfare model developed by Harsanyi (1955) for expected utility can be viewed in the same manner.
Next, we digress to discuss the special but common case in which there are only two health outcomes of interest. We show that in this case a policy analyst can assume that the individual cardinal relations i are the same even though it is apparent that they are not; indeed, the analyst does not even need to assess a common individual scale.
Suppose that an analyst wishes to use a linear health model in a policy study. Most likely, he or she can envision a wide range of health outcomes for the individuals in the defined population. Assume, however, that the health distributions to be examined in the study contain only two health outcomes. The health distributions in the study differ in that different subgroups of the population have one outcome or the other. Our impression is that this situation is common. It may occur for various reasons; e.g., the available data provide needed health information only on the two outcomes, or the analyst decides that only the two outcomes are relevant to the study. Suppose that w P h = a 1 w 1 h 1 + · · · + a n w n h n is an associated population scale. For a health distribution h, define S h = i = 1 n: h i = h 1 }. Then, for any health distribution whose only health outcomes are h 0 and h 1 , the population scale w P h) reduces to the form
In a model as described in Corollary 1, the only assessment task for the analyst is to assess the interpersonal weights a i i = 1 n. Section 8 discusses a procedure for determining the weights a i by assessing so-called person trade-offs.
Equal Individual Scales and Equal Interpersonal Weights
This section discusses two simplifications of a linear health model. First, we present a model in which conditions on preferences imply equal individual scales, and then we present a model in which conditions on preferences imply both equal scales and equal interpersonal weights. These special linear health models will be much easier to implement than the general model.
Equal Individual Scales
We expect that in most health policy studies the health outcome sets H i can be chosen as a common set H , and the individual cardinal relations i can be chosen as a common relation I . The set of possible outcomes for an individual can still vary significantly from one person to another; for example, younger people and older people may have quite different sets of possible outcomes. What is assumed is that preferences between changes in outcomes (whether possible or not) do not vary significantly from one person to another. This condition does not mean that society is indifferent between a change for one person and the same change for another person. 
is a population scale. The weights a i in (7) are unique up to a common positive multiple.
For the purposes of comparing policy options and of evaluating a single option, the gain in simplicity of a population scale (7) over a population scale (5) appears to outweigh its loss in generality; indeed, we regard Theorem 6 as the basic model for purposes of application. Sections 8 and 9 discuss reasons for this opinion. The potential use of a population scale (7) to evaluate a policy option as well as to compare policy options is reflected in the terminology below.
Definition 3. A model as described in Theorem 6 will be called a population health evaluation model, and a scale (7) in such a model will be called a population evaluation scale.
Equal Interpersonal Weights
In this subsection, we ask when the interpersonal weights in a population health evaluation model will be equal. A common individual scale w I h i is cardinally unique, and for a given scale w I h i , the interpersonal weights are unique up to a positive multiple. It follows that whenever there exist equal weights for some population scale, then any weights for any population scale are equal. Hence, we can speak loosely of "equal weights."
The result below provides conditions on preferences that imply both equal individual cardinal relations and equal interpersonal weights. We will call a model that satisfies these conditions an equal weights model. In this model, the only assessment task is to assess a common individual scale w I h i . For any such scale, the corresponding function w P (h) is a population scale.
Theorem 7. Suppose that the health outcome sets H i in a linear cardinal model are equal, and that h 0 is a fixed but arbitrary health outcome. Then, the following conditions on preferences are equivalent, and they are satisfied if and only if the model is an equal weights model. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
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(a) For any individuals i and j and any health outcome h, the changes in health distributions
h i = h 0 h k = h 0 k = i → h i = h h k = h 0 k = i and h j = h 0 h k = h 0 k = j → h j = h h k = h 0 k = j(
c) For any individuals i and j and any health outcome h, the health distributions
h i = h h k = h 0 k = i and h j = h h k = h 0 k = j(9
Should Different Interpersonal Weights Be
Assigned to Different Age Groups? What differences among the members of a population should imply unequal importance for the same changes in health outcomes for different individuals? One possibility is differences in age. Here we discuss several reasons why different interpersonal weights might be assigned to people of different ages.
First, age can be related to the social importance of individuals. Murray (1994) and Murray and Acharya (1997) argue that because working-aged adults make greater economic contributions than do children or seniors, their health has greater social importance. The authors assign unequal weights to persons of different ages as part of a "disability-adjusted life years" (DALY) scale for health outcome-streams. Often, in a DALY scale the weight assigned to a person aged 25 is about twice the weight assigned to someone aged 6 or 67. See Anand and Hanson (1997) for a critical review. In our opinion, it is not justified to infer unequal social importance from unequal economic roles. Moreover, U.S. health policies (e.g., health programs for children and Medicare) implicitly assign greater weights to children and to seniors than to working-aged adults.
Second, age can be related to concerns for equality. Greater age tends to imply greater lifetime health and longevity. Williams (1997) argues for assigning weights that favor equality in people's lifetime quality-adjusted life years. The weights resulting from this "fair-innings argument" will be greater for younger people than for older people.
Greater age also tends to imply lesser future health and longevity. One can argue for assigning weights that favor equality in people's future quality-adjusted life years. The weights resulting from this futureequality argument will be greater for older people than for younger people.
Another criterion-one in the spirit of utilitarianism-is to assign weights that favor the sum of improvements in health and longevity. This criterion is meaningful for cardinal utility but not for ordinal or expected utility. First, assume that health outcomes are defined as health states-with the duration of a health state and any ensuing states unknown. A change in health states (e.g., from fatality to a state of no health problem) is likely to produce a greater improvement in a person's health and longevity for a younger person than for an older person. So when health outcomes are defined as health states, the resulting weights may be greater for younger people. But when health outcomes are defined as healthduration pairs, a change in health outcomes entails the same improvement in health and longevity for an older person as for a younger person. So for healthduration pairs, knowing the ages of the population members does not provide a reason for assigning unequal weights.
Typically, the comparison of policy options in an equal weights model with health states will differ from a comparison of the same options in an equal weights model with health-duration pairs or health outcome streams. In particular, fatalities will count the same regardless of age in the model with health states, whereas a fatality for an older person will count less INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
than a fatality for a younger person in the model with health-duration pairs or health outcome streams. In such a context, one cannot assign equal weights both in the model with health states and in the model with health-duration pairs or health outcome streams. Similar observations have been made for expected-utility models; see, e.g., Bordley (1994) and Hammitt (2002) .
Assessment Procedures
In this section and the next, we describe two types of procedures concerning a cardinal scale; those in this section are for constructing a cardinal scale, and those in the next section are for using a cardinal scale.
In both sections, we assume that social values satisfy the conditions for a population health evaluation model. Here, we describe statements of social values that a policy analyst can use to determine an individual scale and interpersonal weights (and hence a population scale). The statements might be, for example, interview responses by a policy maker, modeling judgments by the analyst, or assumptions of social values that the analyst uses to evaluate policy options conditional on the assumptions. For brevity, we will refer to any such statements as assessments, and we will refer to their use to determine a scale or weights as assessment procedures.
We limit the discussion to assessment procedures that require both individual and population cardinal relations and Pareto agreement between them. We do not discuss assessment procedures such as time tradeoffs that have been developed for noncardinal preference relations.
Assessing Conditions on Cardinal Preferences
One method of assessment is to assess a condition on cardinal preferences (such as those defined in previous sections) that implies a property of an individual scale or that implies equal interpersonal weights. Some of the conditions regarding an individual scale imply that the scale has a functional form, e.g., w I s = f q s and w I s t = D t f q s ; some determine a scale, e.g., w I s = q s and w I s t = tq s ; and some imply that the scale belongs to a parametric family, e.g., w I s = e rq s , r > 0, and w I s t = r −1 1 − e −rt q s , r > 0.
Below, we define two other types of assessments that an analyst can use to determine an individual scale or interpersonal weights. In the case of an individual scale, the analyst can first use assessments of the above type to imply that the scale has a functional form or belongs to a parametric family and then use assessments of the types defined below to determine the scale.
Assessing Person Trade-Offs for Changes in Health Quality
The assessments defined here state social trade-offs between a change in health outcomes and the number of people who experience the change. Similar assessments, called person trade-offs, have been proposed in contexts that do not involve cardinal utility; see, e.g., Richardson (1994) , Nord (1995) , Murray and Lopez (1996) , and Green (2001) . Østerdal (2009) showed that an ordinal additive social welfare model based on person trade-off assessments must be of a certain type in order to satisfy normative conditions such as the Pareto principle.
For our discussion, first suppose that the health outcomes are health states and that the model is an equal weights model. Then, Theorems 1 and 7 imply that there is a population scale of the form w P s = f q s 1 + · · · + f q s n ), where s = s 1 s n denotes a health distribution.
Select a best health state s 1 and a worst health state s 0 , and normalize f q such that f q s 1 = 1 and f q s 0 = 0. Because the conversion function f q is now unique, it remains to find more of its values and then to interpolate between these values.
To find a value of f q , an analyst can select a health state s that is easy to visualize and assess a number k in one of the following statements.
(a) Society is indifferent between an improvement from s 0 to s for the entire population and an improvement from s 0 to s 1 for k members of the population. (c) Society is indifferent between a health distribution in which everyone in the population has the health state s and a health distribution in which k members have the health state s 1 and the remaining n − k members have the health state s 0 . Statements (a)-(c) are equivalent in the sense that the assessed number k should be the same in each one. As a question in behavioral economics, one could investigate whether people do in fact assess the same number k in these statements or exhibit a systematic discrepancy similar to that between people's willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept amounts.
When the interpersonal weights are unequal, one can determine a population scale in two steps. First, select a subpopulation in which the weights are equal and use conditions on cardinal preferences and/or assessments of person trade-offs to determine an individual scale, w I s = f q s ). Then, order the population members in some fashion and use assessments of person trade-offs analogous to (a) and (b) to determine a set of interpersonal weights.
To explain the second step for (a) or (b), suppose that the phrase "for k members" in (a) is replaced by "for the first k members," and the phrase "for n − k members" in (b) is replaced by "for the last n − k members." Suppose that w P s = a 1 f q s 1 + · · · + a n f q s n ) denotes a population scale with the given ordering of the individuals and that the weights are normalized such that a 1 + · · · + a n = c for a specified number c (e.g., c = 1 or c = n). Then, a modified assessment (a) or (b) implies that a 1 + · · · + a k = cf q s ). Here, cf q s ) is known. The analyst can select a list of health states with different degrees of health quality, and thus obtain a list of equations. The weights can then be calculated by solving the simultaneous equations.
Next, suppose that the health outcomes are healthduration pairs, the weights are unequal, and social values satisfy the conditions in Theorem 3. Then, there is a population scale, w P s t = a 1 D t 1 f q s 1 + · · · + a n D t n f q s n ), where (s t = s 1 t 1 s n t n ) denotes a health distribution. The analyst can select a duration t and consider health distributions in which every health-duration pair has the duration t. Then, the scale w P s t) reduces to a population scale regarding health states, and the analyst can use the assessment procedures described above to determine a conversion function f q and interpersonal weights a i . Finally, the analyst can use any of a wide variety of methods to determine a cumulative discounting function D t .
Assessing Social Attitudes Toward Inequality in Health Quality
In an assessment (a)-(c) as described above, an analyst selects a health state s and thus a health quality q = q s , and assesses a number k and thus a proportion k/n. This procedure can be reversed; the analyst can select a number or a proportion and assess a health state or a health quality. In such a reverse person trade-off procedure, one assesses amounts, q = f −1 k/n), and thereby finds a value, f q = k/n, of the conversion function at each assessed amount q.
By using a reverse person trade-off procedure, an analyst can select the proportion k/n = 1 2 . This proportion is relatively easy to visualize; half the population has the best health state, s 1 , and the other half has the worst health state, s 0 . The inverse amount q = f
is the health quality of a middling health state s relative to s 0 and s 1 ; that is, the changes, s 0 → s and s 0 → s 1 , are indifferent according to the individual relation.
A reverse person trade-off involves population health and thus is an assessment of social values. Below, we explain how it can be interpreted as an assessment of social attitude toward inequality in health quality. Suppose that q 1 = q s 1 ) and q 0 = q s 0 ) are the best and worst amounts of health quality, respectively, and that there is a population scale, w P s = f q s 1 + · · · + f q s n ).
Suppose that s 0 1 is a health distribution in which half the population has the health quality q 1 , whereas the other half has the health quality q 0 , and that s avg INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s). Additional information, including rights and permission policies, is available at http://journals.informs.org/.
is a health distribution in which the entire population has the average health quality, q avg = with extreme inequality in health quality. In this sense, society is averse to inequality in health quality with respect to q 0 and q 1 . In the case that q avg > q indiff for any pair of health qualities q 0 < q 1 , we will say that society is averse to inequality in health quality. The reader can check that the population relation satisfies this condition if and only if the conversion function f q is strictly concave.
Suppose that an analyst assesses that social values have cardinal constancy with respect to a quality scale q s . Then, by Theorem 2, the conversion function f q has a linear-exponential form (1). A single reverse person trade-off suffices to determine the parameter r in (1), and the value of r determines society's attitude toward inequality in health quality for any q 0 < q 1 . By an extension of the above terminology, society is averse, neutral, or prone to inequality in health quality when r is negative, zero, or positive, respectively.
Evaluation Procedures
Suppose that in a study of population health, an analyst has identified a set of policy options, has estimated the changes h → h in population health that the options may produce, and has constructed a population health evaluation model that represents social values relevant to the study. This section describes procedures by which he or she can use a population scale in the model to evaluate a policy option, that is, to calculate and report information on that particular option. Most of these procedures lead directly to methods for comparing two options: the analyst simply determines the difference or the percentage difference in their evaluations.
These procedures are meaningful only in a context of cardinal relations. For a given policy study, an analyst can choose a procedure that he or she judges to be appropriate for the situation.
In most policy studies, the issue is how to modify current policy (or whether to modify it). Typically, each policy option (including the current policy) implies a probability distribution of health distributions. In this paper, however, we discuss only the case in which it suffices to replace any probability distribution by a predicted health distribution. Thus, we focus on the difficulty in recommending a policy that is due to the complexity of the health distributions.
We assume that the analyst models each policy option as a change from a initial health distribution to the health distribution that is predicted to result from the option. To provide a more concrete discussion, we will assume that the initial distribution is the health distribution that is predicted to result from the current policy. The reader should note, however, that the evaluation procedures that are discussed do not depend on this choice; in particular, the analyst could choose a simple, hypothetical health distribution as the initial distribution.
Assume that the population scale is a weighted average, w P h = a 1 w I h 1 + · · · + a n w I h n , where a 1 + · · · + a n = 1. The predicted health distributions for the current policy and for a policy option will be denoted by h cur and by h opt , respectively. Thus, the analyst wishes to evaluate each change h cur → h opt . The health outcomes can be of any type.
Reporting a Change in Health Distributions
One type of procedure for reporting a change h cur → h opt for a policy option is to calculate an indifferent change h → h with simpler health distributions and report the calculated change. The change h → h can be calculated by the formula w P h − w P h = w P h opt − w P h cur . A variety of procedures are possible. For example, the analyst could select the initial health distribution h to be a uniform distribution (i.e., a distribution h = h h) in which everyone has the same health outcome h), and for each policy option calculate a final distribution h that is also a uniform distribution.
The advantage of these procedures is that they do not require the population scale to have a simple interpretation, e.g., as a quality scale or as a QALY scale. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
The reported information is a change in health distributions and not a difference in population scale amounts. The disadvantage of the procedures is that they lack the usual features of measurement; for example, they do not measure a change h cur → h opt as an amount of a single variable.
Reporting a Subpopulation
Suppose that the health outcomes in a policy study range from a worst health outcome, denoted by h 0 , to a best health outcome, denoted by h 1 , and that a policy option implies a change h cur → h opt that is an improvement, or at least not a worsening, in population health.
First, assume that the population health evaluation model is an equal weights model. For each k = 0 n, suppose that h k denotes a health distribution in which k individuals have the health outcome h 1 , and the other n − k individuals have the health outcome h 0 . In particular, h 0 denotes the health distribution in which everyone has the worst outcome h 0 , and h n denotes the health distribution in which everyone has the best outcome h 1 . In such a situation, one can calculate for any change h cur → h opt a change h 0 → h k that is approximately indifferent to h cur → h opt in the sense that the difference, w P h k − w P h 0 ), is approximately equal to the difference, w P h opt − w P h cur ). Then, one can report either the number k or the proportion k/n as an evaluation of the change h cur → h opt . If the population health evaluation model is not an equal weights model, then the population members must be ordered in some fashion, e.g., by increasing or decreasing age. Suppose that h k denotes a health distribution in which the first k individuals have the health outcome h 1 . Then, a number k or a proportion k/n can be calculated as above.
If the individual scale w I h i is normalized such that w I h 0 = 0 and w I h 1 = 1, then in the case of equal weights, k is determined by the first formula that follows, and in the more general case of (possibly) unequal weights, k is determined by the second formula:
These evaluation procedures can be used when the population scale lacks a simple interpretation because they use a scale measured in units which differ from those of the population scale.
Reporting an Average Change in Health
We first discuss procedures for the case in which the health outcomes are health states, and then discuss procedures for the case in which the health outcomes are health-duration pairs. In each case, a weighted average population scale w P h) will serve as an evaluation scale. The key is to identify circumstances in which the scale w P h) has a simple interpretation.
9.3.1. Evaluation Scales for Health States. Assume that an individual scale has the form w I s = f q s ), as described in §4. For a health distribution s = s 1 s n ), suppose thatq denotes its weighted average quality scale amount, that is,q = a 1 q s 1 + · · · + a n q s n .
If preferences have cardinal neutrality for a quality scale q s , then by Theorem 2 one can choose the individual scale as w I s = q s . Then, w P s = a 1 q s 1 + · · · + a n q s n =q. Hence, the scale w P s) has a simple interpretation, namely, as an average health quality, and thus it can be used as an evaluation scale. To evaluate a change s cur → s opt , an analyst can use the formula
Because the difference,q opt −q cur , in average health quality from s cur to s opt equals the average change in health quality from s cur to s opt , the analyst can report the average change in health quality calculated by (10) as an evaluation of the change s cur → s opt . If preferences do not have cardinal neutrality for q s , then the conversion function f q is nonlinear. In this case, the population scale amount of a health distribution may be unequal to its average health quality, and different health distributions with the same average health quality may be nonindifferent. Moreover, a change s cur → s opt in health distributions may be preferred to a change s cur → s opt , even though the average change in health quality is less for s cur → s opt than it is for s cur → s opt . For this reason, it can be misleading to evaluate a change s cur → s opt by its average change in health quality when preferences do not have cardinal neutrality for the health quality scale. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
9.3.2. Evaluation Scales for Health-Duration Pairs. Assume that an individual scale has the product form w I s t = D t f q s ), as described in §5. A health distribution will be denoted by (s t = s 1 t 1 s n t n ). First, consider the use of duration as an evaluation scale. As mentioned in §5, the QALYs of a healthduration pair are defined as follows. First, specify a state s 1 of good health. Then, for any health-duration pair (s t), find a health-duration pair (s 1 ) such that (s t) and (s 1 ) are indifferent, i.e., society is indifferent between a person spending a duration t in a health state s and spending a (presumably shorter) duration in the (presumably better) health state s 1 . Here, it follows that D t f q s = D f q s 1 ). Typically, the scale of durations defined in this manner is called a QALY scale. We will call a duration the QALY duration of a health-duration pair (s t), where the redundant term "duration" is added to emphasize that a QALY scale is a time scale. Define = 1 n ) and s 1 = s For convenience, we will assume that the conversion function f q is normalized such that f q s 1 = 1. It follows that = D −1 D t f q s ). If preferences are cardinal timing neutral, and thus present and future outcomes have the same importance, then by Theorem 4 one can choose D t = t. Then, = tf q s ). Suppose that¯ denotes the average QALY duration of a health distribution (s t), that is,¯ = a 1 1 + · · · + a n n . Then, w P s t = w P s 1 , = a 1 1 f q s 1 + · · · + a n n f q s 1 =¯ . Therefore, the population scale can be interpreted as an average QALY duration, and thus it can be used as an evaluation scale. To evaluate a change (s t cur → s t opt , an analyst can use the formula
Because the difference,¯ opt −¯ cur , in average QALY duration from (s t cur to (s t opt equals the average change in QALY duration from (s t cur to (s t opt , the analyst can report the average change in QALY duration as an evaluation of the change (s t cur → s t opt .
If preferences are not cardinal timing neutral, and thus future outcomes are discounted, then the cumulative discounting function D t is nonlinear. In this case, the population scale amount of a health distribution may be unequal to its average QALY duration, and different health distributions with the same average QALY duration may be nonindifferent. Moreover, a change, s cur → s opt , in health distributions may be preferred to a change, s cur → s opt , even though the average change in QALY duration is less for s cur → s opt than it is for s cur → s opt . In a model that discounts future outcomes, it can be misleading to evaluate a change s cur → s opt by its average change in QALY duration.
What should be done in the case of nonzero discounting? Here, we propose a procedure that is dual to the QALY procedure discussed above in that it uses health qualities rather than durations as an evaluation scale. To define a scale based on health quality, first select a duration t 1 that is to play the role of the health state s 1 . Perhaps, t 1 is an extremely long duration (what might be called a Methuselahn duration). Then, for any health-duration pair (s t), find a health-duration pair (s t 1 such that (s t) and (s t 1 ) are indifferent, i.e., society is indifferent between a person spending a duration t in a health state s and spending a (presumably longer) duration t 1 in the (presumably worse) health state s . Suppose that denotes the health quality of the health state s , that is, = q s ). We will call the years-adjusted life quality of the health-duration pair (s t), and we will abbreviate this phrase as YALQ. To emphasize that a YALQ scale is a health quality scale, we will call a health quality a YALQ quality.
Define t 1 = t 1 t 1 ) and s = s 1 s n ). Pareto agreement implies that a health distribution (s t) is indifferent to the health distribution (s t 1 ) with a uniform duration of t 1 because for each individual the corresponding health-duration pairs are indifferent.
As in the discussion of health states, suppose that social preferences have cardinal neutrality for q s . Then, by Theorem 4 one can choose the individual scale as w I s t = D t q s − q s 0 ), where s 0 is the standard state defined in §5. We will assume that the quality scale q s has been normalized such that q s 0 = 0, and thus w I s t = D t q s . We also assume INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
that the cumulative discounting function D t has been normalized such that D t 1 = 1. Suppose that¯ denotes the average YALQ quality of a health distribution (s t , that is,¯ = a 1 1 + · · · + a n n . Then, w P s t = w P s t 1 = a 1 D t 1 1 + · · · + a n D t 1 n =¯ . Hence, w P s t) can be interpreted as an average YALQ quality, and thus it can be used as an evaluation scale. 
A Hypothetical Application for Hypertension
This section illustrates how the models and procedures in this paper can be applied. The example we present concerns the evaluation of a proposed therapy for hypertension, known informally as high blood pressure. The example is hypothetical, both in the data from clinic trials and in the assessment of individual and population scales. It is also hypothetical in that neither of us has expertise on hypertension. We take most of our information from a summarizing report, Chobanian et al. (2003) , published by the American Heart Association. Optimal blood pressure is defined as a systolic blood pressure (SBP) of 115 mm Hg and a diastolic blood pressure (DBP) of 75 mm Hg (or is defined as SBP less than 120 mm Hg and DBP less than 80 mm Hg). Hypertension is defined as an SBP greater than 140 mm Hg or a DBP greater than 90 mm Hg. The World Health Organization estimates that suboptimal blood pressure is responsible for about twothirds of cerebrovascular disease and about one-half of ischemic heart disease worldwide.
Blood pressure can be measured by two general methods. The more accurate method, called ambulatory blood pressure monitoring (ABPM), is to have a person wear a monitoring device during a 24-hour period. The less accurate method, which we will call office measuring (OM), is to measure the person's blood pressure in a medical office. As discussed in Chobanian et al. (2003) , there are significant and variable differences in the measurement results of the two methods.
Stage I hypertension is defined in Chobanian et al. (2003) as an SBP in the range of 140-160 mm Hg and a DBP in the range of 90-100 mm Hg as measured by the OM method. Because Stage I hypertension is defined in terms of the OM method, individuals with this diagnosis can have a wider range of actual SBP and DBP amounts.
Suppose that as part of larger project a research team wished to evaluate the effectiveness of a proposed therapy for reducing blood pressure in individuals with Stage I hypertension. The therapy is a combination of a drug regimen and counseling sessions to promote lifestyle changes. It was expected to have tolerable but not insignificant side effects of the drugs and disruption due to the lifestyle changes. In part because the therapy includes lifestyle counseling in addition to drugs, it was anticipated to have significantly different effects on blood pressure for different populations defined by factors such as level of education, age, and other health variables.
The goal of the subproject was to evaluate the ability of the therapy to reduce the risks of cerebrovascular disease and ischemic heart disease associated with hypertension for prospective populations of individuals who are diagnosed with Stage I hypertension-and if possible to compare the predicted risk reduction of the therapy in different defined populations.
First, the researchers defined six categories of individuals, called Categories I-VI, based on information other than blood pressure. Then, they conducted clinical trials of the therapy for persons with Stage I hypertension. For each participant, extensive information was gathered, and the person was placed in one of six sample populations, also called Categories I-VI, according to the information. Measurements of blood pressure were taken at the beginning and at the end of a four month period (with different periods for different individuals). The more accurate ABPM method was used because the researchers were interested in the ability of the therapy to reduce an individual's actual blood pressure. Each person's blood pressure measurements were aggregated into a single SBP amount and a single DBP amount such INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
that greater SBP and DBP amounts indicated greater health risks according to previous studies (see below). A health outcome was defined as a health state measured by a person's calculated SBP and DBP. Thus, s = (SBP, DBP). The data for each sample population consisted of an initial distribution s int of health states s int at the beginning of the trial periods and a final distribution s fin of health states s fin at the end of the trial periods. Hence, the data from the clinical trials consisted of the information in the changes s were appreciably different; in particular, they had different averages of SBP and of DBP. The researchers next consulted studies that related blood pressure and risks of cerebrovascular disease and ischemic heart disease. The studies had considered different types of risk, i.e., different measures of the risk of different categories of morbidity and fatality. One type of risk was the probability of a major stroke during a person's lifetime. For persons with Stage I hypertension, the risk measures seemed to have linear relationships with one another, i.e., greater differences in one risk measure seemed to correspond with greater differences in the other risk measures.
Because of this concurrence between types of risk, the researchers were able to define an individual cardinal relation I on changes s → s in blood pressure in terms of the consequent changes in risk without specifying the type of risk. For the same reason, they were able to define a population cardinal relation P on changes s → s in health distributions in terms of changes in the sum of the risks for the population members without specifying the type of risk.
The researchers judged that these cardinal relations satisfied the conditions for the existence of cardinal scales, e.g., the condition of dynamic consistency mentioned in §3. They also judged that the cardinal relations satisfied the conditions for a population health evaluation model with equal interpersonal weights.
The blood pressure variables and the risk scales measured harms and disutilities rather than goods and utilities. Recognizing this, the researchers translated the population health evaluation model into a harm/disutility model. In this discussion, however, we will translate as we proceed.
The second part of the project was to assess individual and population scales. Based on the risk studies, the researchers judged that for fixed SBP and DBP amounts, the health states (SBP + 20, DBP) and (SBP, DBP + 10) are associated with about the same risk, and that intermediate health states, e.g., (SBP + 10, DBP + 5), have about the same risk. Based on these judgments, they assessed a linear quality scale, q s = −20 −1 (SBP − 115 − 10 −1 (DBP − 75). Later, the researchers decided for reasons of convenience to redefine the quality scale as one-half this amount, namely, as q s = The researchers next observed that an increase in SBP or DBP from a higher level has a greater effect on risk than the same increase from a lower level; e.g., an increase from 140 to 155 mm Hg is worse than an increase from 115 to 130 mm Hg. Hence, the functional dependence of risk on blood pressure is convex over the observed range. By translating from harms to benefits, the conversion function f q , which represents the dependence of an individual scale on q s , is concave.
The researchers modeled f q by verifying the condition of cardinal constancy, at least as a rough approximation. This condition can be stated by fixing, for example, the variable DBP and considering different amounts of the variable SBP. Then, cardinal constancy states that if two changes SBP → SBP * and SBP * → SBP incur equal changes in risk, then for any amount the changes SBP + → SBP * + and SBP * + → SBP + incur equal changes in risk. By Theorem 2, cardinal constancy implies that there is a conversion function f q having the linearexponential form in (1). The concavity of f q then implies that there is a conversion function of the form f q = −e rq , and hence an individual scale of the form w I s = −e rq s , for some parameter amount r < 0. To assess the parameter r, the researchers used the studies relating blood pressure to risks. Chobanian et al. (2003 Chobanian et al. ( , p. 1210 states that, " [f] or every 20 mm Hg systolic or 10 mm Hg diastolic increase in BP [blood pressure], there is a doubling of mortality from both ischemic heart disease and stroke." This statement does not specify what change in DBP accompanies a 20 mm Hg increase in SBP or vice versa. Because individuals with a 20 mm Hg higher SBP also INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
have a 10 mm Hg higher DBP much more often than no higher DBP, we guess that the statement refers to an increase of 20 mm Hg in SBP and an increase of 10 mm Hg in DBP. Such increases in SBP and DBP correspond to a decrease of one unit in q s . A risk measure is linearly related to the individual scale; that is, risk = af q + b. Hence, the above discussion implies that af q − 1 + b = 2 af q + b). To solve this equation for q, differentiate with respect to q to obtain f q − 1 = 2f q . Because f q = −e rq , this implies that r = −ln Because the researchers had constructed an equal weights model, there was no need to assess interpersonal weights. Moreover, a population scale amount w P s) did not depend on how the individuals in the population were indexed.
The Category I-VI sample populations had different sizes, as would prospective populations of persons with Stage I hypertension. For that reason, the researchers chose an averaging population scale, that is, they chose the scale
where n is the size of the population, (SBP i , DBP i ) is the health state of the ith individual in the population, and w I (SBP i , DBP i ) is as specified above. The third part of the project was to use the population scale to evaluate (and if possible to compare) the effectiveness of the therapy to reduce risk in prospective populations consisting of individuals with Stage I hypertension who have the characteristics of Categories I-VI. Such a population was called a category k population where k = 1 6. As described above, the clinical trials provided the data, s
6, from the six sample populations. First, the researchers calculated evaluations of the therapy. They considered each of the three types of evaluation discussed in §9. Their conclusions were as follows.
(1) The researchers specified the uniform distribution s 0 with s 0 = 150, 95) and for each k = 1 6 calculated a uniform distribution s k such that s int k → s fin k is indifferent to s 0 → s k . The calculated distributions ranged from s 1 = 137, 88.5) to s 6 = 141, 90.5). The researchers reported that for a category k population, the reductions in risk due to the therapy would be equivalent to the reductions in risk due to a uniform reduction in blood pressure from s 0 to s k .
(2) The researchers specified s l = 140, 90) and s u = 160, 100) as extreme health states for Stage I hypertension, and for each k = 1 6 calculated a fraction p k such that the change s int k → s fin k is indifferent to a change from a uniform distribution with s u to a distribution in which blood pressure is reduced from s u to s l for a fraction p k of the population and remains at s u for the remaining fraction of the population. The calculated fractions ranged from p 1 = 0 53 to p 3 = 0.41. The researchers reported that for a category k population, the reductions in risk due to the therapy would be equivalent to the reductions in risk due to an extreme reduction in blood pressure from s u to s l in a fraction p k of the population.
(3) The researchers observed that because the conversion function f q is concave, a change s
would not be indifferent to the change from a uniform distribution with the average amounts of SBP and DBP in s int k to a uniform distribution with the average amounts of SBP and DBP in s fin k . For this reason, they did not report the reductions in risk due to the therapy in category k populations as equivalent reductions in risk due to changes in average blood pressure.
The researchers were also able to compare the effectiveness of the therapy to reduce risk for pairs of different category k populations. To do so, they first calculated the differences,
6. The differences ranged from w 1 = 1 41 to w 6 = 1 07. The differences w k show that the therapy would be most effective for Category I patients and least effective for Category VI patients. The researchers were also able to make quantitative comparisons. The cardinal uniqueness of the population scale implies that ratios w j / w k are independent of the particular scale w P s). Moreover, the risk measures in the studies of cerebrovascular disease and ischemic heart disease are linearly related to the scales w P s) (because both are linearly related to w I s ). Thus, from the fact that w 1 was 32% greater than w 6 , the researchers were INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
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for any t 1 < t 2 t > 0, and t > 0. In Harvey (1998a, Theorem 5.2) , it is shown that if a strictly increasing, continuous function D t is a solution of this functional equation, then it is a linear-exponential function. By part (iv), D t is strictly concave, and thus it is a negative-exponential function. Because D 0 = 0, this implies that D t = a 1 − e −rt for some r > 0 and a > 0. Next assume that the cardinal relation has constant cardinal timing aversion (II). Then, D t 2 f q s − D t 1 f q s = D t 4 f q s − D t 3 f q s , for s t 1 < t 2 , and t 3 < t 4 , and thus, D t 2 + t f q s − D t 1 + t f q s = D t 4 + t f q s − D t 3 + t f q s , for t > 0. Choose a health state s such that f q s = 0, and choose durations such that t 2 = t 3 and t 2 − t 1 = t 4 − t 3 . Define t = t 1 t = t 2 t = t 4 . Then, the above implication states that D t = D t + t . Therefore, the function D t is a solution of the functional relationship (13), and thus it is a linear-exponential function. By the argument used in the previous case, it follows that D t = a 1 − e −rt for some r > 0 and a > 0. Proof of Theorem 5. We will obtain Theorem 5 from the social welfare model in Harvey (1999, Theorem 1) , to be called the SW model. More accurately, we will prove Theorem 5 by using the proof of the SW model, because Theorem 5 generalizes of the SW model in an important respect. We can omit proofs of the converse implications because they are straightforward to verify.
Suppose that the set C of social consequences in the SW model is chosen as the product set H 1 × · · · × H n . As noted in §6, an individual cardinal relation i for a set H i corresponds to a cardinal relation, to be denoted by Consider condition (C) in the SW model. It states in part that there exist continuous cardinal scales for the relations i and P . It also states that the set C is connected, a condition that we do not require here. Instead, we assume that the relations i and P are proper. Thus, we simply assume the properties in Lemma 1 of the SW model, which state that n, the health distribution h has the same ith component as h i , and thus it is indifferent to h i according to i .
In summary, the assumptions in Theorem 5 imply that the cardinal relations i and P have the properties of the relations SW i and SW P that are stated in the Lemma 1 of the SW model. As the reader can verify, it is these properties rather than conditions (C) and (D) that are used in the proof of the SW model. Hence, by using that proof of the SW model, it follows that for any cardinal scales w i h i and w P h there exist constants a i > 0 i = 1 n, and b such that w P h = a 1 w 1 h 1 + · · · + a n w n h n + b
Therefore, for any given individual cardinal scales w i h i i = 1 n, the function, v P h = w P h − b = a 1 w 1 h 1 + · · · + a n w n h n , is a population cardinal scale of the form (5). Now we show that the constants a i in (5) are unique up to a common positive multiple. For any > 0, the function, v P h = v P h = a 1 w 1 h 1 + · · · + a n w n h n , is a cardinal scale for the relation P . Conversely, suppose that a function v P h = a * 1 w 1 h 1 + · · · + a * n w n h n is a cardinal scale for P . Then, v P h = v P h + for some constants > 0 and , and thus, (a * 1 − a 1 w 1 h 1 + · · · + a * n − a n w n h n = . The cardinal scales w i h i have nonpoint ranges because the relations i are proper, and thus a * i = a i i = 1 n (and then = 0) because the terms on the left-hand side can vary independently of one another.
Proof of Theorem 6. Because the individual cardinal relations i i = 1 n, are equal, they have the same cardinal scales. By choosing the scales w i h i i = 1 n, as such a common scale, Theorem 6 follows as a special case of Theorem 1. Suppose that v P h = a 1 v 1 h 1 + · · · + a n v n h n is a population scale associated with the individual scales v i h i . Then, for a health distribution h such that h i = h 1 for i in S h) and h i = h 0 otherwise, we have v P h = i∈S h a i as was to be shown.
Proof of Theorem 7. Properness and cardinal uniqueness imply that there are individual scales w i h i such INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
that w i h 0 = 0 i = 1 n. Suppose that w P h = a 1 w 1 h 1 + · · · + a n w n h n is an associated population scale. Then, w P h 0 h 0 = 0. First, assume condition (a) or condition (c). Then, for any health outcome h, the indifference (8) or the indifference (9) implies that w P h i = h; h k = h 0 k = i = w P h j = h; h k = h 0 k = j , and thus a i w i h = a j w j h . For j = 1, it follows that w i h = a 1 /a i w 1 h . Thus, w 1 h is an individual scale for every individual cardinal relation. Suppose that w I h denotes the scale w 1 h and that v P h = 1 w I h 1 + · · ·+ n w I h n denotes an associated population scale. By the previous argument, i w I h = j w I h for any i j. Hence, i = j for any i j. Second, assume condition (b) or condition (d). Then, by essentially the above argument there is a common individual scale w I h i such that w I h 0 = 0. Suppose that w P h = a 1 w I h 1 + · · · + a n w I h n is an associated population scale. For any i j, there exists a health outcome h such that h is nonindifferent to h 0 (and thus w I h = 0), and either the indifference (8) or the indifference (9) is satisfied. Then, w P h i = h; h k = h 0 k = i = w P h j = h; h k = h 0 k = j , and thus a i w I h = a j w I h . Because w I h = 0, it follows that a i = a j .
It is straightforward to verify the converse implications that in an equals weights model the conditions (a)-(d) are satisfied.
